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Here we show the extent to which the expected world population
growth could be lowered by successfully implementing the recently
agreed-upon Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs include
specific quantitative targets on mortality, reproductive health, and
education for all girls by 2030, measures thatwill directly and indirectly
affect future demographic trends. Based on a multidimensional model
of population dynamics that stratifies national populations by age,
sex, and level of education with educational fertility and mortality
differentials, we translate these goals into SDG population scenarios,
resulting in population sizes between 8.2 and 8.7 billion in 2100.
Because these results lie outside the 95% prediction range given by
the 2015 United Nations probabilistic population projections, we com-
plement the study with sensitivity analyses of these projections that
suggest that those prediction intervals are too narrow because of un-
certainty in baseline data, conservative assumptions on correlations,
and the possibility of new policies influencing these trends. Although
the analysis presented here rests on several assumptions about the
implementation of the SDGs and the persistence of educational, fer-
tility, and mortality differentials, it quantitatively illustrates the view
that demography is not destiny and that policies can make a decisive
difference. In particular, advances in female education and reproduc-
tive health can contribute greatly to reducingworld population growth.
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Today, the future of world population growth looks moreuncertain than it did a decade ago because of a controversial
recent stalling of fertility decline in a number of African coun-
tries and a controversy over how low below replacement level
fertility will fall, particularly in China (1). Probabilistic population
projections try to quantify these uncertainties based on statistical
extrapolation, expert judgement, or a blend of both (2, 3). Al-
though such projections published in 2008 (4) gave a 95% pre-
diction interval ranging from 5.2 to 12.7 billion for the global
population in the year 2100, probabilistic projections published by
the United Nations (UN) Population Division in 2015 based on a
different approach give a much narrower 95% interval ranging
from 9.5 to 13 billion in 2100 (3). Another recent set of world
population projections defined alternative global population sce-
narios in the context of the work of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) and related integrated assessment
models. In the medium scenario these Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways (SSPs) show a peaking of world population around 2070
at 9.4 billion, followed by a decline to 9 billion by the end of the
century with high and low scenarios reaching 12.8 and 7.1 billion,
respectively (5, 6). As discussed below, these differences in world
population projections result from different approaches taken in
terms of disaggregating national populations according to age, sex,
and education structures and in combining statistical extrapolation
with expert knowledge in specifying assumptions for the future.
In September 2015 the leaders of the world under the um-
brella of the United Nations in New York subscribed to an
ambitious set of global development goals, the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs). If actually pursued, several of these
targets, particularly in the fields of reproductive health and female
education, will have strong direct and indirect effects on future
population trends, mostly in the direction of lower population
growth. In this paper we endeavor to translate the most relevant of
these goals into SDG population scenarios and thus quantify the
likely effects of meeting these development goals on national
population trajectories. The results show that meeting these goals
would result in the world population peaking around 2060 and
reaching 8.2–8.7 billion by 2100, depending on the specific SDG
scenario (Fig. 1). This analysis quantitatively demonstrates that
demography is not destiny and that policies, particularly in the
field of female education and reproductive health, can contribute
greatly to reducing world population growth.
The different variants of the SDG scenario specified here, al-
though consistent with the SPP scenarios, all lie substantially below
the lower bound of the 95% band given by the most recent prob-
abilistic UN projections (Fig. 1). This difference evidently poses
serious questions to the reader. Therefore, after describing the
definition and calibration of the demographic SDG scenarios, this
paper has a second section in which we perform sensitivity analyses
of the UN population projections, using the UN’s software; our
analyses suggest that the prediction range given by the UN un-
derestimates the full uncertainty of possible future world pop-
ulation growth. We study the sensitivity with respect to possible
baseline errors and correlation and show how explicit incorporation
of heterogeneity in level of education changes the picture. Our
main point, however, is that the UN model rests on the strong
assumption of structural continuity of past trends extrapolated over
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the full 21st century, an assumption that is incompatible with the
aspiration of the UN’s own SDGs to mount an historically un-
precedented effort to change the course of global development.
Translating the SDGs into Corresponding Population
Scenarios
The SDGs as approved by the UN General Assembly in the
presence of most heads of state in September 2015 contain 17
goals and 169 specific targets. Unlike the previous Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), which were set in 2000 with the
target year 2015, the SDGs refer not only to developing countries
but instead to all countries in the world, and they include envi-
ronmental dimensions in addition to social and economic di-
mensions. Many of the SDGs are motivated by their longer-term
future impacts, such as the energy and climate change goals, but
the goals themselves have a target year of 2030 to allow better
monitoring of the actual achievements of these goals. Some of
the goals and associated targets are expressed in precise nu-
merical form and refer to existing indicators; others are more
qualitative in nature and refer mostly to the direction of change.
Population trends are not explicitly mentioned in the SDGs, but
several of the SDGs are directly or indirectly related to future
demographic trends. The SDG goals related to child mortality,
maternal mortality, causes of death, and reproductive health can
be translated more or less directly into future mortality and fer-
tility pathways. To assess the indirect effects of improvements in
education on fertility and mortality quantitatively, we use recent
advances in multidimensional population modeling, namely the
3D analysis by age, sex, and level of education (7). This work is
based on the insight that, after age and sex, the level of education
is the most important source of observable population heteroge-
neity. Consistently, more-educated women experience lower fer-
tility and lower child mortality, particularly during the process of
demographic transition, and more-educated men and women have
higher life expectancies. This relationship has been corroborated
recently (7), and the case has been made that improvements in
female education have functional causality on declining fertility
(8). It has been shown that, even under identical sets of education-
specific fertility trajectories, different education scenarios alone
can induce a variation of more than 1 billion in the size of the total
world population by midcentury (7).
We define special scenarios translating the SDGs into pop-
ulation trajectories against the background of a recent set of
scenarios developed for and by the international climate change
research community, the SSPs (6). The human core of the SSPs
also consists of population scenarios by age, sex, and level of
education for all countries to the year 2100 (5). In the following
discussion we refer to three of the five SSPs, namely SSP1 (the
rapid-development scenario), SSP2 (the middle-of-the-road sce-
nario), and SSP3 (the stalled-development scenario). Although
the methodology and the empirical dataset of the SSPs are used
here, we redefine some of the specific assumptions regarding fu-
ture fertility, mortality, and education with reference to the SDGs
and their specific targets. As specified in detail in the following
paragraphs, the main underlying idea is that implementing the
SDGs will help speed up the process of demographic transition
that otherwise would occur more slowly. In the following trans-
lation of the SDGs into population trends the goals are inter-
preted as a one-time booster to development between 2015 and
2030 to be followed beyond 2030 by development at a more
regular speed. For this reason the SDG population scenarios are
lower than the middle-of-the-road SSP2 scenario but are not as
low as the fast-development SSP1 scenario, which assumes
accelerated social development throughout the century. Because
of the path dependencies of the education expansion and the
demographic transition, this 15-y booster will result in education,
fertility, and mortality levels lower than those of SSP2 for the rest
of the century. For readers who think that the boost in develop-
ment caused by the SDGs will continue beyond 2030, for the rest
of the century, the SSP1 scenario is a reasonable approximation,
although the SSPs were defined before the SDGs and hence differ
in some minor aspects.
Operationalizing the Education Targets
SDG4, which aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality
education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all”
consists of 10 targets. The most specific of these targets, 4.1,
states that “by 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free,
equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading
to relevant and effective learning outcomes.” This target can be
directly translated into demographic outcomes in the context of
the multidimensional population projections methodology men-
tioned above. Other targets referring to early childhood develop-
ment, equal access to vocational and tertiary education (without
giving quantitative targets), skills for employment, education facili-
ties, scholarships, and teacher training highlight other important
aspects of education that are more difficult to translate into quan-
titative models. However, two further targets with rather specific
aspects also can be partially quantified, namely 4.5 (“By 2030,
eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to
all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable,
including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children
in vulnerable situations”) and 4.6 (“By 2030, ensure that all youth
and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women,
achieve literacy and numeracy”). If we consider that 4.5 is just one
specific aspect of the more general target 4.1, which already includes
universal high-quality education of all boys and girls, and that, in-
deed, if target 4.1 is realized, all young men and women will become
literate and numerate, no additional assumptions need to be made.
Although universal primary education was part of the earlier
MDGs, the addition of universal secondary education in the
SDGs is new and much more ambitious. This addition is based
partly on recent insights that, for poor countries to come out of
poverty, universal primary education is not enough and must be
complemented by secondary education for broad segments of the
population (9). For countries that currently have very low pri-
mary school enrollment, the target of universal secondary edu-
cation by 2030 may seem overly ambitious. For this reason there
have been some discussions within the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and
elsewhere about whether this target should be interpreted in
Fig. 1. Future world population growth as projected according to the three
SSP scenarios, the range of SDG scenarios presented here, and the proba-
bilistic ranges given by the UN population projections.
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terms of the somewhat more realistic achievement of universal lower
secondary education or whether it actually implies universal com-
pletion of upper secondary school, which indeed is not achieved in
all industrialized countries. We account for this difference in inter-
pretation by specifying an alternative SDG education scenario,
SDG2, in which only universal lower secondary education is reached
in 2030; the two other scenarios, SDG1 and SDG3, are based on the
literal meaning of the goal of universal upper secondary education by
2030 but differ in their fertility assumptions.
The scenarios of educational expansion underlying the pop-
ulation projections presented here result from a further re-
finement of the education model presented in Lutz et al. (5). In
summary, we project the share of the population ever reaching or
exceeding a given attainment level. These projections are made
separately by country and sex but with shrinkage within a Bayesian
framework (with weakly informative priors). The mean expansion
trajectories are modeled as random walks with drift (and potential
mean reversion) and independent noise at a probit-transformed
scale (see Fig. S1 for India and Nigeria). More details about this
new education model are given in the Supporting Information.
Translating the Health Targets into Future Mortality
Trajectories
Like many of the other goals, SDG3 (“Ensure healthy lives and
promote well-being for all at all ages”) consists of some very
specific and some general targets. There are specific numerical
targets for the reduction of maternal mortality and infant mor-
tality. Less specific but still highly relevant for future fertility
trends is target 3.7 referring to reproductive health and family
planning, which is discussed in the fertility section below.
Many other of the 13 specific health targets relate to indi-
vidual causes of death such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria,
water-borne diseases, accidents, substance abuse, chemical pol-
lution, and preventable noncommunicable diseases in general.
Modeling in detail how these specific targets on certain causes of
death would translate into aggregate mortality rates for all
countries of the world is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead
we refer to a major recent exercise involving more than 100 in-
ternational mortality experts identifying the different forces that
will influence future mortality trends and translating them into
alternative future mortality trajectories (10, 11). Three mortality
trajectories (high, medium, and low) were defined for all coun-
tries. The low path corresponds quite well, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, to the health and mortality targets discussed above.
Because this trajectory was also specified in terms of education-
specific mortality trends—with more-educated women having uni-
versally lower child mortality rates and better-educated adults living
longer on average —the education scenarios discussed above also
will indirectly influence the future course of national mortality
trends. Furthermore, the effects on the education-specific mortality
rates of other goals, in particular those referring to eradication of
poverty and hunger and to improvement of governance, are as-
sumed already to have been captured by the very optimistic mor-
tality assumptions used for this low-mortality trajectory.
Defining Education-Specific Fertility Trajectories
In addition to the indirect effect of education on aggregate fer-
tility levels, the health SDG includes one target that is likely to
affect education-specific fertility rates directly. Target 3.7 states
“By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive
health-care services, including for family planning, information
and education, and the integration of reproductive health into
national strategies and programmes.” Although the second part
of the target is more organizational in nature, the first part refers
directly to the concept of meeting the unmet need for contra-
ception and has the potential to affect fertility levels directly by
rapidly increasing contraceptive use. The unmet contraceptive
need is usually defined as the proportion of currently married
women who are not currently using contraception and who say
that they do not want another child in the near future. In esti-
mating the number of births that would be avoided in the hy-
pothetical case that all unmet contraceptive need were met, it is
important to distinguish further between unmet needs for birth
spacing and for limiting overall family size. Only the latter can be
assumed to have a lasting effect in lowering fertility rates.
Several authors have attempted to estimate quantitatively the
effect on national fertility levels of meeting the unmet need for
contraceptives. The most comprehensive analysis is by Bradley at
al (12), using all available Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) and applying a more precise definition of measuring the
unmet need for limiting family. For the global average of all 59
DHS for developing countries, they find that, if the unmet
contraceptive need were eliminated, the total fertility rate (TFR)
would be 20% lower (i.e., 3.3 instead of 4.1 children per woman).
They find regional differences, with the hypothetical decline
being highest in absolute terms in East and Southern Africa (3.7
compared with 5.0 children per woman) and in relative terms in
Latin America and Caribbean (2.0 versus 3.0 children per
woman). In West and Central Africa the decline would be the
smallest (4.9 versus 5.4 children per woman) because the desired
family size is still very high in this part of Africa. Hence, loosely
speaking, these calculations refer only to the difference between
desired and actual family sizes, whereas education of women also
tends to result in lowering the desired family size.
In operationalizing the SDG fertility scenario, the assumption
that achieving “universal access to sexual and reproductive
health-care services, including for family planning, information
and education” will result in 20% lower education-specific fer-
tility rates by 2030 is relatively straightforward. Because these
services cannot be established overnight, this scenario is imple-
mented by gradually lowering fertility rates from their current
levels to a level that is 20% lower than that in the middle-of-the-
road scenario (SSP2) by 2030 (Fig. 2). For the period 2015–2030
the SDG1 and SDG2 scenarios are also equivalent to the as-
sumptions made for education-specific fertility under the rapid
social development scenario (SSP1). After 2030, however, the
SSP1 and the SDG1 and SDG2 scenarios start to differ in their
fertility assumptions because under SSP1 the low-fertility tra-
jectory is assumed to continue, whereas in the SDG scenario
narratives there is a gradual return to the middle-of-the-road
trajectory. The return will not be abrupt and will be complete
only after the overall TFR has reached a level of 1.6 children per
Fig. 2. Education-specific fertility rates for Nigeria under the assumptions
of the SSP2 scenario and the 20% lower SDG1 scenario.
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woman (see Supporting Information for more details). The methods
for determining the education-specific fertility trajectories for SSP1
und SSP2 are described in detail elsewhere (5).
To test further the projections’ sensitivity to different trans-
lations of the SDGs into education-specific fertility rates, we also
made the more conservative assumption that those rates will de-
cline by only 10% by 2030 in relation to the middle-of-the-road
SSP2 scenario, rather than by 20% as assumed in the SDG1 and
SDG2 scenarios. The SDG3 scenario thus combines a 10% de-
cline in education-specific fertility rates with the assumption of
universal senior secondary education by 2030.
Migration and Other Factors
Migration is the third factor, in addition to fertility and mortality,
that directly affects national population sizes in the future. Al-
though migration can have significant effects, especially for small
populations with high in- or out-migration, it is a negligible
factor for global population growth and affects the projections
only through the assumption that migrants will have the fertility
and mortality rates of the country of destination. Except for
stressing the need for orderly migration and the rule of law, the
SDGs do not give any specific quantitative targets that would
suggest either higher or lower international migration streams in
the future. For this reason the migration assumptions of the SDG
scenarios are the same as those used for the middle-of-the-road
SSP2 scenario, i.e., that constant in- and out-migration rates grad-
ually diminish toward the end of the of the projection period (5).
Several of the other SDGs that were not discussed above, such as
end of poverty and end of hunger, reduced inequalities, decent
work, economic growth, affordable and clean energy, climate ac-
tion, and quality of institutions, could have potential indirect effects
on future fertility, mortality, migration, and education. To study
whether these factors are likely to have effects beyond those as-
sumed in the SDG scenarios here remains a research topic for the
future. However, for our attempt to develop a first approxima-
tion of demographic scenarios that reflect the SDGs, we assume
that the specified sets of low-fertility and -mortality and high-
education trajectories implicitly include all the other possible in-
direct effects of different SDGs on those demographic trends.
More information about methods, data, and assumptions and
country-specific results are provided in the Supporting Informa-
tion. In particular, the model producing the education scenarios
is described in detail. The basic model in the education scenarios
specifies that the inverse probit of the share attaining a given
education level or higher among the entire cohort follows a
random walk with country-specific drift. The Supporting Infor-
mation also lists in tabular form the numerical results of pro-
jections for the different SDG and SSP scenarios to 2100 for all
world regions and selected larger developing countries, provides
more details on the sensitivity analysis of the UN projections, and
shows the results of selected country-specific sensitivity analyses.
All programs and input data used can be found at www.iiasa.ac.at/
SDGscenarios2016.
Scenario Results
Figs. 1 and 3 show the resulting population growth trajectories at
the global level and for Nigeria (and India in Fig. S2). Table S1
also shows numerical results by continents. More details, in-
cluding country-specific results, are given in the Supporting In-
formation. As expected from the assumptions listed above, SDG1
gives the lowest population, and SDG3 gives the highest pop-
ulation of the three SDG scenarios. The SDG scenarios are to-
ward the lower end of the SSP1–SSP3 range, generally below the
middle-of-the-road scenario SSP2 and above the rapid-development
scenario SSP1. The SDGs tend to fall into the lower quartile of the
prediction ranges given by the UN probabilistic population pro-
jections at the national level, as can be seen for Nigeria in Fig. 4. At
the global level, however, all SDG scenarios lie far below the 95%
range of the UN range. This difference in the prediction ranges of
the national and global results is mostly a consequence of the very
low correlations assumed in the UN projections, as discussed below.
The SDG scenarios as defined here result in a world population
that still increases to 8.8–9.1 billion by midcentury and then levels
off and starts a moderate decline to 8.2–8.7 billion by 2100. This
trajectory is significantly below the medium variant of the UN
projections, which reaches 9.7 billion in 2050 and 11.2 billion in
2100. This lower global population trajectory is caused primarily by
the accelerated declines in fertility associated with the female ed-
ucation and reproductive health goals in Africa and Western Asia.
Sensitivity Analysis of UN Probabilistic Population Projections
In 2012, the UN Population Division first published probabilistic
world population projections to 2100 based on a Bayesian model
that estimated future national fertility trajectories drawing from
the collective experience of all countries for the period 1950–
2010 (13). These projections include crucial model assumptions
about the ultimate level of fertility and an eventual increase of
fertility in countries that reach very low fertility levels. The 2015
revision of these projections applies a similar model with the
Fig. 3. Nigeria: Resulting population size for the SDG1–3 and the SSP1–3
scenarios and UN ranges.
Fig. 4. Sensitivity analysis, global level. From left to right the panels show
the following projections: the UN 2015 assessment as published by the UN;
the UN model as applied to baseline data in the UN 2008 assessment; the UN
model applied to a 10% higher baseline TFR in selected countries; the 10%
lower baseline TFR; and the UN 2015 model assuming perfect correlation.
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addition of a probabilistic mortality component and updated base-
line data (3). As we show in the following discussion, this extrapo-
lative model is particularly sensitive to small changes in the baseline
data for the most recent years.
In many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the in-
formation about current population size, fertility, and mortality
levels is fragmentary, with estimates often based on outdated
censuses or surveys that may show contradictory results. Nigeria
is a case in point. In 2008 the UN estimated a TFR of 5.32 for
the period 2005–2010; for the 2012 assessment the TFR was
corrected upwards by 13%, to 6.00. In the 2015 assessment the
estimate for 2005–2010 again was lowered somewhat, to 5.91.
This minimal downward correction in the baseline TFR resulted
in a major change in the median population size projected for
2100 for Nigeria from 914 million (in the 2012 assessment) to
752 million (in the 2015 assessment). The DHS (14) gives a TFR
of 5.5 for 2010–2013, which, if implemented in the UN model,
would give a still much lower projection. Baseline uncertainty
exists for many countries, particularly in Africa. Even in China,
which still has the world’s largest national population, estimates
for recent the TFR range from 1.8 to 1.2 (15), an uncertainty of
20% up or down from 1.5.
We present three different sensitivity analyses with respect to
uncertainty in the baseline data. In the first, we only use the UN’s
own fertility baseline data, because they have been used in suc-
cessive assessments from 2008 to 2015 and apply the probabilistic
model used in 2015. The first two panels on the left of Fig. 4
present the results of this exercise, showing that the two assess-
ments published only 7 y apart show a qualitatively very different
pattern for the 21st century. Based on the 2008 baseline the same
model shows a median that levels off and starts to decline before
reaching 10 billion. The third and fourth panels in Fig. 4 show
the results of projections in which the fertility baseline is assumed
to be systematically 10% higher or lower, respectively, than in the
2015 Revision of World Population Prospects (WPP2015) in the
countries of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia and in China but
remains unchanged for all other countries. The results show that
the projection model is so sensitive to possible systematic errors in
baseline fertility that the resulting 95% prediction intervals for the
world to the end of the 21st century do not even overlap: Under
the “reduced TFR” scenario the upper end of the 95% range in
2100 is 10.8 billion, and under the “increased TFR” scenario the
lower end of the range is 11.4 billion.
One may argue that the possibility of a systematic upward or
downward bias in baseline TFR is rather unlikely, but it cannot
be ruled out because the same kinds of measurement instru-
ments (such as DHS or related surveys) are used for virtually all
African countries. For this reason we also tested the sensitivity to
baseline errors in just one country with the baselines in all other
countries of the world remaining unchanged (see Supporting
Information). The results for Kenya (in Fig. S3) show that, even
without assuming any systematic error across groups of coun-
tries, the projected median population size in 2100 with the TFR
reduced by 10% from baseline is below the lower end of the 80%
range of the projections based on the increased baseline TFR. In
sum, these calculations demonstrate that purely extrapolative
statistical models that do not take into account any country-
specific substantive information about socio-economic or insti-
tutional determinants of fertility or expert knowledge about
foreseeable changes are highly sensitive to possible measurement
errors in the most recent data points.
Another reason for the narrow global prediction interval of
the UN projections results from assuming virtually no intercountry
correlation for the rest of this century. As a consequence, even the
UN’s own high and low variants, which assume perfect correlation
of fertility, lie far outside the 95% range of their probabilistic
projections. In the case of no or low correlation, the trajectories
above expectation in one country cancel those below expectation
in another country. While for most individual countries the dif-
ferent SDG scenarios lie within the 95% prediction interval of the
UN (see the example of Nigeria in Fig. 3 and India in Fig. S3), the
assumption of virtually no intercountry correlation partially ex-
plains why at the global level they lie outside the 95% prediction
interval.
Because the given software does not allow specifying alter-
native levels of correlation for the future, we could only emulate
the case of assumed perfect correlation (right panel in Fig. 4).
The resulting probabilistic prediction range is wider than the
official probabilistic projections by a factor of five. It also shows
that, in probabilistic terms, the range between the UN’s high and
low variants (16.6 and 7.3 billion in 2100, respectively) corre-
sponds roughly to 85% of the range given by these projections
with perfect correlation, although they lie far outside the 95%
range of the official projections.
Discussion
In the context of sustainable development, world population
growth is sometimes called “the elephant in the room.” Many
view it as one of the most important factors in causing envi-
ronmental degradation and in making adaptation to already
unavoidable environmental change more difficult (16–18). At the
same time it is widely perceived as a politically sensitive topic
(19), and indeed the 1994 International Conference on Population
and Development explicitly opposed the setting of “demographic
targets.” Fertility decisions are considered a private matter, with
the role of the state being only to assure reproductive rights and to
provide reproductive health services. It is presumably for this
reason that the new SDGs do not mention population growth or
fertility explicitly in any of the 169 targets. However, many of the
goals and targets deal with factors that directly or indirectly in-
fluence fertility and thus population growth.
In this paper we quantified the likely effects of some of the
most relevant SDG targets in the areas of health and education
based on a set of plausible assumptions. In doing so we built on
the recent literature that has quantified the effects of education,
in particular female education, on fertility, child mortality, and
life expectancy in general. There is increasing evidence that
education, particularly in countries in demographic transition,
has a direct causal effect on lowering desired family size and
empowering women to realize these lower fertility goals. The
availability of reproductive health services also helps enhance
contraceptive prevalence. Because universal primary and second-
ary education of all young women around the world is a prominent
goal in its own right (SDG 4) and is politically unproblematic—
except for a few fundamentalist groups that oppose girl’s education—
this focus on education provides a strong and convincing policy
paradigm that, in addition to all the other beneficial consequences of
education, also leads to lower fertility (20).
Lowering child mortality and decreasing adult mortality from
many preventable causes of death are also politically unproblematic
policy priorities. For child mortality the SDGs give precise nu-
merical targets that could be directly translated into demographic
trajectories and could be complemented through estimates of the
indirect effects of better education on survival at all ages. This
exercise also could build on the recently developed set of SSPs that
now are widely used among the integrated assessment and climate
change research community and for which alternative projections of
populations by age, sex, and level of educational attainment provide
the human core. These scenarios also blend the effects of edu-
cation with those of income and better food security, which are
other important SDGs. Although clearly more research is needed
to study the synergies between the different SDGs (21) and their
possible additional impacts, the range of population trajectories
resulting from different specifications of the SDG scenarios pre-
sented in this paper would likely not change significantly and
hence present a good first approximation.
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It is important to stress that this quantification of the likely
effects of implementing of the SDGs on future population trends
rests on many assumptions and therefor includes many “ifs.”
First, it is far from certain that the relevant SDGs will be fully
implemented in all countries of the world. One can look at
the MDGs set for 2000–2015 for guidance on this issue: The
achievement was impressive in the global average, but at the
country level the record was mixed. In particular, it may be un-
likely that the ambitious education targets will be met in some of
the poorest African countries. For this reason we have included
some less ambitious education goals among the set of SDG
scenarios. Similarly, the assumption that universal access to re-
productive health services will result in 20% lower education-
specific fertility rates may be questionable. Therefore we also
included scenarios that assume only a 10% effect. Finally, we
assume that the assessed relationships between education and
fertility and between education and mortality persist over the
entire projection horizon. Although there is strong theoretical
and empirical support for the assumption that education has a
persistent functional causal effect over the course of demo-
graphic transition (5, 7), the education effect is far from being a
universal certainty, and the results based on this assumption
therefore must be viewed as conditional.
It also was noted that the population growth trajectories that
would result from the successful implementation of the SDGs,
although consistent with the SSP scenarios, would lie far outside
the 95% prediction range given by the 2015 UN probabilistic
population projections. For this reason we conducted sensitivity
analyses of the UN projections using their own software and
came to the conclusion that the prediction ranges as presented
are likely too narrow for considering the full range of possible
future trajectories, including possible structural discontinuities.
We presented analyses showing the great sensitivity of the UN
projections to possible errors in baseline estimates of fertility and
assumptions concerning the correlation among national trends.
Both aspects suggest that markedly wider prediction ranges
should be considered. There are further problems with the sta-
tistical extrapolation model used by the UN that go beyond the
scope of this paper. In particular, one may question the model
in which all national fertility trends are given equal weight,
irrespective of whether they summarize the experience of only a
few thousand couples or hundreds of millions of couples. Be-
cause in fertility couples, not states, are the relevant decision-
making units, and many countries are highly heterogeneous with
respect to reproductive behavior, one could well argue that cou-
ples rather than countries are the independent units of observa-
tion that should be given equal weight; doing so would greatly
change the projection results. Again, this change would work in
the direction of a broader range of uncertainty.
The world community under the leadership of the UN launched
an unprecedented global effort to accelerate global development
strongly within the framework of the SDGs. Many of these goals,
if reached, will have important effects in lowering future fertility
and mortality rates, particularly in the least developed countries.
However, ambitious as these goals are, leaders of all countries and
the entire UN system have committed themselves to do whatever
is required, possibly including unconventional measures, to reach
the specified targets, and progress is being monitored closely. This
new global effort is, by definition and by its explicit aspiration, a
discontinuity of past trends and hence cannot be captured by
statistical extrapolation of past trends.
More importantly, the analyses presented in this paper show
that, indeed, demography is not destiny, and policies in the field
of reproductive health and female education can have very sig-
nificant longer-term impacts on global population growth. More
specifically, they also illustrate how progress toward reaching the
SDGs can result in accelerated, strictly voluntary fertility declines
that could result in a global peak population around midcentury.
These strong effects of the SDGs on lowering global population
growth in a politically unproblematic and widely accepted way
provide an additional rationale for vigorously pursuing the imple-
mentation of the SDGs.
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